Kebijakan Luar Negeri China

November 8 2023

China’s Conflicting Thoughts During The War Between Israel and Hamas

Samuel Djuarsa Asia Pacific, Politics, Security and Defence, Think BRICS, Hamas, Kebijakan Luar Negeri China, Konflik Israel-Palestina 0

The conflict between Israel and Hamas has brought to light a significant cognitive dissonance stemming from Beijing’s perceptions and strategies about the Middle East. China has endeavored to present itself as an impartial entity in the issue, seemingly aiming to establish its role as a mediator. Nevertheless, the Chinese government has chosen not to denounce the October 7 assault on Israel by Hamas or acknowledge Iran’s involvement in orchestrating these acts of aggression. In contrast, Chinese authorities, media organizations under state control, and social media platforms attribute responsibility for the conflict on Israel and the United States. It is evident that China has consistently expressed support for the Palestinian cause during the Cold War era, employing a customary approach of condemning Israel in order to cultivate positive relationships with Arab and Muslim nations. This can be observed by China’s voting patterns in the United Nations. Similarly, taking advantage of the opportunity to depict the United States as a destabilizing entity and promoting the idea that there exists a feasible alternative to America’s liberal international system is a well-known strategy. Nevertheless, the fundamental principles that guide China’s approach appear to be increasingly incongruent with the evolving dynamics of the Middle East.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, as examples, have subsequently issued official statements denouncing Hamas, a stance that contradicts Beijing’s reasoning. Chinese officials consistently reiterate their longstanding claim that the Israel-Palestinian problem holds paramount importance in the Middle East. However, it appears that their Sunni counterparts no longer espouse this viewpoint. In contemporary times, a considerable number of Arab states have come to hold the belief, in conjunction with Israel, that Iran, as China’s comprehensive strategic partner, represents the primary source of destabilization within the region.

The diplomatic ties between China and the nations of Iran and Saudi Arabia

The shared impression of threat arises from Iran’s propagation of an intolerant form of radical Islam, its development of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, and its assertive utilization of proxy factions with the aim of inciting regional instability, toppling Sunni governments, and annihilating Israel. Senior members of Hamas, in conjunction with Iranian authorities, have provided confirmation that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its affiliated groups provided assistance to Hamas in carrying out this offensive. Qatar serves as an additional significant financial source for Hamas. Hezbollah, an Islamist-militant group associated with Iran, characterized the attack as “a communication directed towards those who are pursuing the process of normalization with Israel.”

The significance of the ideological danger presented to moderate-Sunni regimes by Iran and its proxies should not be underestimated. Over the course of a minimum of ten years, many nations ranging from Morocco to the United Arab Emirates have endeavored to advance a more liberal interpretation of Islam as a viable alternative to the extremist ideology propagated by influential figures such as the Ayatollah of Tehran. The aspirations to establish a more stable and pluralistic Middle East have been expressed in the Marrakesh Declaration of 2016 and the Charter of Makkah of 2019. Similar to Iran, China is likely speculating that if the crisis escalates, the increasing backing of the Palestinians by Sunni populations around the region will eventually prompt their leaders to publicly condemn Israel. Furthermore, if the ongoing conflict were to disrupt the progress made by the U.S.-led Abraham Accords, which have facilitated the normalization of relations between the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan with Israel, it would undermine America’s containment strategy and provide an opportunity for China to advance its alternative approach to regional security, as outlined in its conceptual document titled “Global Security Initiative” released in February 2023.

It is conceivable that Tehran’s proposal may have unintended negative consequences. In light of the aforementioned circumstances, it can be argued that the assault orchestrated by Hamas, with support from Iran, directly undermines the fundamental security interests of numerous Sunni states. Consequently, this situation is expected to bolster Israel’s attractiveness as a viable security ally in the foreseeable future. Recently, Ali Rashid Al Nuaimi, the head of the Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal National Council of the United Arab Emirates, expressed his agreement with this concept. As per the statement made by the chairman, it is asserted that the Accords hold significant importance for our future. The aforementioned statement highlights that the platform in question is not merely a bilateral agreement between two governments, but rather a comprehensive initiative aimed at catalyzing transformative changes in the region. Its overarching objective is to foster an environment characterized by enhanced security, stability, and prosperity for all stakeholders involved. China may perceive strategic benefits in exerting influence over a politically volatile entity such as Iran. In the event that circumstances need, Beijing has the potential to utilize its association with Tehran as a strategic tool in wider geopolitical discussions with other influential entities. China’s current lack of confidence among regional entities and limited regional hard power hinder its significant involvement in the mediation process. Nevertheless, the diplomatic ties between Beijing and the Islamic Republic are expected to secure China’s participation in the negotiation process. Beijing would not extend its influence on Tehran without expecting something in return.

Saudi Arabia is evidently discontented. The Kingdom had anticipated a period of tranquility following its diplomatic agreement with Iran, facilitated by China. The Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), expressed a desire to prioritize the digital and economic development of the nation, advocate for a more moderate interpretation of Islam, and gradually move towards establishing normalized relations with Israel. The Saudi population has the belief that their participation in the accords will result in the marginalization of Hamas, thereby exerting pressure on the Palestinians to renounce terrorism and embrace a peaceful resolution. MBS is observing with a sense of unease, primarily concerned about the situation in Yemen and the involvement of the Houthis, who are widely regarded as an Iranian proxy. The individual would likely have taken notice of the presence of two U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups, perceiving them as a representation of the significance associated with being under the protection of the U.S. security framework. This may not necessarily be advantageous for China in the long run.

Has the opportunity been wasted?

It is evident that, despite Beijing’s extensive range of interests in the Middle East, encompassing oil, economic, technology, and security domains, it is highly unlikely that China’s Fujian carrier will be deployed in the region in the near future. The escalation of tensions between China and Western nations has resulted in an increased level of China’s involvement in the region. This is evident through its efforts to grow the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China’s emerging regional military presence leaves it vulnerable, as it depends on the regional hard power projection capabilities of its strategic competitor to safeguard its interests. However, Beijing missed a significant chance to establish mutual understanding with its adversaries, including the United States (and the Western world in general), India, and Japan, by neglecting to condemn Hamas. Beijing acknowledges that its stance is likely to find support among several countries in the Global South, such as South Africa, Malaysia, and others, particularly when presented with anti-colonial rhetoric.

There have been emerging reports indicating a rise in coordinated dissemination of anti-Israel and anti-U.S./Western propaganda within the Iran-China-Russia alliance. It is probable that this tendency will persist. In order to provide a broader viewpoint, a commentator characterized a recent episode on CCTV as generating the perception that Israel initiated the bombing of Gaza without any apparent justification, including the deliberate targeting of emergency vehicles, thereby reinforcing the notion that such actions are characteristic of Israel. According to Matt Turpin, an individual who held the position of China Director at the U.S. National Security Council during the period of 2018 to 2019, the axis is engaged in the dissemination of content that capitalizes on divisions present within and between democratic nations. This is achieved by amplifying popular criticisms originating from both the left and right ends of the political spectrum within individual countries. Chinese officials, scholars, and state media persistently propagate the notion that the absence of a Palestinian state and the historical injustices endured by the Palestinian people are the fundamental factors contributing to the current predicament. These perspectives are considered to be crucial to comprehending the broader Middle East issue. Chinese scholars, politicians, and observers frequently neglect to acknowledge the fact that Hamas has officially articulated its intention to establish an Islamic State of Palestine including the entire region “from the river to the sea,” so implying the absence of Israel. Nonetheless, the utilization of reductionism becomes advantageous in instances where it aligns with Beijing’s inclination to attribute all of the region’s difficulties to Israel and the United States. Furthermore, it is highly probable that this action is deliberate. Presenting a concise and easily understandable method to address a multifaceted problem proves to be a highly impactful and efficient means of communication, particularly in the context of a meme. Chinese scholars have demonstrated a tendency to utilize historical events in shaping their narratives. However, it is noteworthy that they frequently omit the fact that Israel has extended multiple offers to the Palestinians for the establishment of a state. Regrettably, the Palestinians have consistently declined these proposals.

China’s stance disregards the internal dynamics within the Palestinian community that hinder advancements in this area. In 2006, Hamas was democratically elected to govern the Gaza Strip. Subsequently, in the following year, Hamas forcefully displaced the Palestine Authority, which continues to govern the West Bank. Consequently, these two entities have since maintained a contentious and adversarial relationship. Corruption pervades the ranks of both political parties, and the absence of an independent Palestine results in a continuous influx of substantial foreign money, which is utilized to sustain their respective military capabilities, construct complex tunnel networks, and amass personal wealth, while ordinary Palestinian citizens endure hardship. With whom does Beijing propose that Israel engage in negotiations?

The irony lies in the fact that Hamas and Iran, along with their proxies, espouse and endorse an extremist form of intolerant Islam that China perceives as a significant threat. This has led Beijing to adopt domestic measures that have attracted strong condemnation from the global community. The transnational nature of radical Islamist ideology is exemplified by the incident in which an Israeli individual was subjected to a stabbing attack in the public spaces of Beijing. Forging closer ties with Tehran is unlikely to effectively protect China or its interests in the Middle East against the threats of separatism, extremism, and terrorism, which are being stoked by the Ayatollah and his followers. In fact, it may have the opposite effect. Chinese intellectuals and policymakers are not unaware of these realities. Nevertheless, the leadership of China appears to have the perspective that admitting these matters does not significantly contribute to the advancement of Beijing’s goals. China has undoubtedly made adequate preparations to assume the role of the rotating presidency at the United Nations Security Council for the current month. The text is expected to portray China’s “Global Security Initiative” as a potential catalyst for peace, prosperity, and a resolution to the security issues faced by the Middle East. As a demonstration of amity, unity, and endorsement for Israel, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, and U.S. President Joe Biden recently undertook a visit to Tel Aviv. In the context of China’s foreign policy in the Middle East, it asserts amicable relations with all nations in the region, a claim that raises questions regarding its feasibility.

August 3 2023

Undang-undang baru tentang hubungan luar negeri menambah arsenal hukum China

Rifani Agnes Eka Wahyuni Asia Pacific, Politics, Security and Defence, Think China, Kebijakan Luar Negeri China, Undang-undang 0

China baru-baru ini mengesahkan undang-undang baru tentang hubungan luar negeri, yang secara tegas bertujuan untuk melindungi “kedaulatan, keamanan nasional, dan kepentingan pembangunannya.”[1] Undang-undang Hubungan Luar Negeri ini sejalan dengan situasi yang ada seperti yang disampaikan oleh Komisi Keamanan Nasional China,[2] yang baru-baru ini memperingatkan bahwa “kompleksitas masalah keamanan nasional” yang dihadapi China telah meningkat secara eksponensial. Badan tertinggi negara tirai bambu ini mengisyaratkan bahwa negara ini harus bersiap untuk menanggung “ujian berat” dalam kondisi buruk dan menghadapi skenario terburuk. Hal ini menunjukkan perubahan besar dalam pemikiran China, yang kini menempatkan keamanan di atas pembangunan.

Dengan perdebatan politik di China yang berpusat pada keamanan nasional dan kebutuhan untuk melawan yurisdiksi “tangan panjang” Amerika Serikat (AS),[3] UU ini diharapkan dapat memberikan kekuatan bagi negara Partai Komunis China menggunakan undang-undang domestiknya untuk membalas sanksi asing. Sebuah esai tentang UU tersebut, yang ditulis oleh Wang Yi, yang diterbitkan dalam jurnal Partai Komunis China (CPC) Qiushi,[4] menyatakan bahwa langkah tersebut akan memperkuat kepemimpinan terpusat Komite Sentral Partai dalam urusan luar negeri, dan memperbaiki kekurangan dalam sistem hukum yang mengatur hubungan luar negeri. Pertama, hal ini menunjukkan niat Partai Komunis untuk mengkonsolidasikan cengkeramannya terhadap keterlibatan luar negeri negara. Hal ini juga terlihat dari pengangkatan Wang Yi sebagai kepala Komisi Urusan Luar Negeri Pusat setelah Kongres Partai ke-20, meskipun ia telah melewati batas usia yang resmi.[5] Sementara kode tidak tertulis CPC menetapkan 68 tahun sebagai usia pensiun bagi para elit, pengecualian dibuat untuk Wang Yi yang berusia 69 tahun tahun lalu.

Pembersihan hukum ini juga sejalan dengan pendekatan hukum Partai Komunis China, di mana undang-undang digunakan sebagai sarana untuk mencapai tujuan strategis. AS telah menerapkan sanksi terhadap Menteri Pertahanan China Li Shangfu dan pejabat China lainnya dan membatasi perusahaan teknologi seperti Huawei.[6] Pada gilirannya, China mengeluarkan undang-undang anti-sanksi pada tahun 2021, yang memberdayakan Beijing untuk mengambil tindakan balasan terhadap entitas asing dan individu yang terlibat dalam tindakan diskriminatif yang “melanggar hukum internasional”.

Esai Wang Yi di Qiushi[7] selanjutnya menambahkan bahwa risiko dan faktor tak terduga yang membayangi pembangunan negara adalah alasan untuk undang-undang tersebut. Undang-undang ini memiliki beberapa konsekuensi eksternal karena secara khusus menyebutkan Inisiatif Sabuk dan Jalan (BRI), dan mengamanatkan bahwa kepentingan warga negara dan organisasi China di luar negeri harus dilindungi. Proyek tandatangan Xi, BRI, telah membuat China memperluas jejak ekonominya secara global. Namun, China juga menghadapi risiko terjerat dalam perselisihan lokal saat berekspansi secara internasional, dan kepentingannya dapat berbenturan dengan kepentingan entitas lain. Sebagai contoh, warga negara dan bisnis China menjadi sasaran di Kepulauan Solomon setelah adanya klaim bahwa uang China[8] memengaruhi pemungutan suara di parlemen. Hal ini memicu perdebatan di China mengenai perlindungan warga negaranya di luar negeri dengan Guo Xiaobing,[9] seorang akademisi dari Pusat Studi Pengendalian Senjata di Institut Hubungan Internasional Kontemporer China, yang berargumen untuk meningkatkan kemampuan China dalam melindungi warga negaranya karena hal ini terkait dengan keamanan ekonominya. Kementerian Luar Negeri China telah mengumumkan bahwa Kepulauan Solomon akan menjadi fokus dari proyek-proyek Belt and Road dan zona ekonomi khusus.[10]

Sebuah investasi dapat dikatakan layak, jika dapat memastikan keuntungan di masa depan, yang bergantung pada variabel-variabel yang berubah-ubah seperti stabilitas politik. Undang-undang hubungan luar negeri menimbulkan pertanyaan tentang sejauh mana Republik Rakyat China akan melindungi warga negara dan kepentingan ekonominya di luar negeri? China telah bersandar pada Pakistan untuk mengizinkan perusahaan keamanannya sendiri di negara tersebut setelah serentetan serangan fatal terhadap warga negara China.[11] Menurut laporan Mercator tentang BRI, ada hampir 5.000 perusahaan keamanan swasta yang terdaftar di China.[12] Kita telah melihat konsekuensi buruk dari Rusia yang menyerahkan kendali kepada aktor swasta non-negara di bidang keamanan, dan untuk memenuhi tujuan strategisnya. Kita juga memiliki contoh dari sejarah di mana ‘bendera’ yang didampingi oleh angkatan bersenjata Inggris bangkit untuk melindungi ‘perdagangan’ dan kepentingan komersial dan geopolitik Kerajaan. Dengan demikian, negara-negara yang menjadi tujuan investasi BRI harus memperhatikan konsekuensi dari undang-undang hubungan luar negeri China yang baru.

China telah menerima kritikan karena pendekatannya yang menggunakan pinjamannya di luar negeri untuk keuntungan geopolitik dan geoekonomi. Sekarang, seolah-olah untuk menutupi jejaknya, undang-undang baru ini menegaskan bahwa RRT menghormati kedaulatan negara penerima dan tidak melampirkan syarat-syarat politik pada bantuan keuangannya. Namun, bukti-bukti menunjukkan hal yang sebaliknya, terutama dalam insiden Yuan Wang 5,[13] di mana China bersandar pada Sri Lanka yang secara ekonomi lemah dan terlilit utang untuk mengizinkan berlabuhnya sebuah kapal penelitian yang dilengkapi untuk melacak peluncuran satelit dan rudal. Secara signifikan, Kanada[14] telah membekukan hubungan dengan Bank Investasi Infrastruktur Asia (AIIB) yang dipimpin oleh China dan sedang menyelidiki tuduhan yang dibuat oleh seorang mantan karyawan bank bahwa Partai Komunis China telah menyusup ke dalam lembaga keuangan tersebut.[15]

Undang-undang baru ini kemungkinan besar akan memiliki konsekuensi yang luas bagi bisnis, negara, dan para pembangkang, di antara banyak pemangku kepentingan lainnya. Para pembangkang China dapat dihukum karena mengkritik negara, atau bahkan karena tidak cukup mendukung “kepentingan China”, baik di China maupun di luar negeri. Bisnis, terutama bisnis asing, harus sangat berhati-hati ketika melakukan pertukaran dengan perusahaan-perusahaan China, karena takut dituduh bertindak melawan “pembangunan” atau “keamanan” China. Undang-undang ini juga dapat “menekan” ruang diplomatik Taiwan, karena negara-negara dan perusahaan mungkin berpikir dua kali sebelum mendukung perjuangan mereka melawan China karena takut akan pembalasan hukum dan sanksi. Baru-baru ini, telah ada upaya untuk memperdalam keterlibatan ekonomi India dengan Taiwan, di mana China menegaskan kedaulatannya. Taiwan juga bertindak berdasarkan pendekatan ‘China-plus-satu’ dan perusahaan-perusahaan teknologinya ingin mengalihkan operasinya ke India dari China,[16] dan ada rencana untuk mendirikan Pusat Ekonomi dan Budaya Taipei (fasilitas diplomatik de facto) di ibukota keuangan India, Mumbai.[17] Bagaimana hal ini akan berdampak pada negara-negara seperti India masih harus dilihat karena China mungkin akan melihat langkah ini sebagai pelanggaran terhadap kepentingan pembangunan dan kedaulatan nasionalnya.

Sebagai penutup, undang-undang tersebut tidak menjelaskan secara spesifik ruang lingkup “keamanan nasional dan kepentingan pembangunan China,” atau sifat tindakan yang mungkin melanggar hukum, yang membuat ketentuannya sangat rentan terhadap interpretasi politik. Undang-undang ini digambarkan sebagai “kurang dari sebuah ketentuan hukum”[18] dan “lebih merupakan pernyataan politik kepada dunia” disampaikan oleh Dennis Weng, profesor ilmu politik di Universitas Sam Houston. Dengan demikian, dengan UU Hubungan Luar Negeri, China telah menambahkan senjata baru ke dalam gudang senjatanya untuk melawan sanksi dan semakin mengkonsolidasikan cengkeraman Partai Komunis China terhadap keterlibatan luar negeri. Hal ini akan mengintensifkan persaingan China dengan Barat dan negara-negara lain.

[1]Xinhua, The Law on Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China https://english.news.cn/20230628/28c7aedd386440ba9c370eb22476d430/c.html

[2] Xi Jinping presided over the first meeting of the 20^th National Security Commission of the Central Committee, emphasizing the acceleration of the modernization of the national security system and capabilities, and the new security pattern to ensure the new development pattern, Xinhua, 30 Mei 2023. http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2023-05/30/c_1129657348.htm

[3] China Daily, Explainer: China’s foreign relations law to take effect, its significance explained, 30 Juni 2023. https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202306/30/WS649e7228a310bf8a75d6c8f5.html

[4] People Daily, Implementing the law on foreign relations and providing strong rule of law safeguards for diplomacy of a great power with Chinese characteristics in the new era, 29 Juni 2023. http://www.qstheory.cn/qshyjx/2023-06/29/c_1129723078.htm

[5] Shi Jiangtao, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi still in line for top diplomatic role, South China Morning Post, 22 Oktober 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3196905/chinese-foreign-minister-wang-yi-still-line-top-diplomatic-role

[6]ANI, US not considering lifting sanctions imposed Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu, 24 Mei 2023. https://www.aninews.in/news/world/us/us-not-considering-lifting-sanctions-imposed-on-chinese-defence-minister-li-shangfu20230524230436/

[7] People Daily, Implementing the law on foreign relations and providing strong rule of law safeguards for diplomacy of a great power with Chinese characteristics in the new era, 29 Juni 2023. http://www.qstheory.cn/qshyjx/2023-06/29/c_1129723078.htm

[8] Maria Siow, In Solomon Islands, a calm after riots, but suspicions of China linger, South China Morning Post, 24 Januari 2022. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3164236/solomon-islands-calm-after-riots-suspicions-china-linger

[9] Yang Sheng & Cui Fandi, China to upgrade security guarantee for development in new plan, Global Times, 30 Oktober 2020. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202010/1205141.shtml

[10]Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Reguler Press Confrence on May 26, 2022. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202205/t20220526_10693124.html

[11]Adnan Aamir, China wants own security company to protect assets in Pakistan, Nikkei Asia, 28 Juni 2022. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-wants-own-security-company-to-protect-assets-in-Pakistan

[12]Helena Legarda & Meia Nouwens, Guardians of the Belt and Road, Merics, 16 Agustus 2018. https://www.merics.org/en/report/guardians-belt-and-road

[13] Harsh V.Pant, Ship of concer, O https://www.orfonline.org/research/ship-of-concern/

[14] Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, Remarks for the Deputy Prime Minister regarding the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 14 Juni 2023. https://deputypm.canada.ca/en/news/speeches/2023/06/14/remarks-deputy-prime-minister-regarding-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank

[15] Bob Pickard, 14 Juni 2023. https://twitter.com/BobPickard/status/1668871011968663553?s=20

[16] Shubhajit Roy, Mumbai is Taiwan’s next stop as its firms move far from China, The Indian Express, 6 Juli 2023. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/mumbai-is-taiwans-next-stop-as-its-firms-move-far-from-china-8779907/

[17]Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan), Republic of China (Taiwan) to establish Taipei Economic Cultural Center in Mumbai to further advance substantive ites with India, 5 July 2023. https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1328&s=115023

[18] Jeff Pao, China ‘Foreign Relations Law’to punish decouping, Asia Times, 1 Juli 2023. https://asiatimes.com/2023/07/china-foreign-relations-law-to-punish-decoupling/